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ADMIRALTY.

It may be remembered that in 37 AM. LAW REG. (N. S.)
233, the decision of the District Court in the case of The International, holding that a steam dredge is a vessel
SVessels,"
What are
and not dutiable as* "goods, wares and merchandise," was commented upon, and reference made to the appeal
that had been taken. The decision of the Circuit Court of
Appeals, Third Circuit, affirming that of the court below,
appears in 89 Fed. 484. The argument of Bradford, J,, that
because ice-boats and pleasure yachts are vessels, though the
former be designed solely to keep navigation open, and the
latter may carry neither passengers nor merchandise for hire,
therefore, this steam dredge is also a vessel, seems to be a complete non sequitur. The reference to The Conqueror, 166 U. S.
x io, is also not conclusive. Everyone knows that "vessels "
are not dutiable within the tariff acts; the question was whether
It is to be regretted that the
a steam dredge is a "vessel."
opinion of the Supreme Court will probably not be obtained
on this point, though it is most likely that the same result
would be reached.
The predictions of the weather bureau are often incorrect,
it is true, but the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit does not consider that tugq which start on
Towage,
a voyage relying on such predictions should be
Negligence,
considered negligent or careless, as was urged by
Weather
Predictions counsel for the libellants in the case of The E. V.
McCaulley, go Fed. 5 1o. As it appeared that the loss of the
tow was not attributable to the breaking of the hawser, which
it was claimed was of insufficient strength, but that the tow
would have been lost anyway in the violent storm encountered,
the decree of the District Court, dismissing the libel, was
affirmed.
i68
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CARRIERS.

It is not necessarily negligence in a passenge'r to ride on
the-platform of a car, and a railway company waives its notice
Waiver of

against standing in that .position when it fails to

provide a seat for the passenger, and yet, receives
him
on the-train." The fact that there is standing
h
Riding on
room on the inside of a ear does not raise a conPlatfor-m
clusive presumption of negligence. The question is for the
jury: Grahamv. McNeill (Supreme Court of Washington), 55
Pac. 63x. The authorities support this ruling: Hutchinson,
Carriers (2d Ed.), § 652; Beach, Contributory Negligence
(2d Ed.), § 149; . Shearman & Redfield, Negligence, § 284;
Wood, Railway Law, § 308.
Notice

Against

The obligation of a carrier to exercise a degree of care proportioned to the .bodily condition of the passenger, was
Carrir's enforced in Haug v. Great N. R., 77 N. W.
Duty to
(N. Dak.) 97. Plaintiff's husband was carried
Drunken
beyond his destination by the defendant company's
Psg
negligence, and was put off at the next station.
He was in an irresponsible and helpless condition of drunkenness, a fact known to defendant's servants, and the night was
bitterly cold; he was not allowed to remain in the railway
station, which was closed for the night soon after the train left,
and no other accommodations were available. Death resulted
from exposure. Judgment for defendant on demurrer was
reversed by the Supreme Court.
The exact case has never before arisen, but the decision
seems in line with the authorities: Louisville, Etc., R. v.
Sullivan, 8I Ky. 624 (1883), [ejection between stations on a
cold night]; Louisnille, Etc., R. v. E-llis, 97 Ky. 330 (1895),
[train coming]. In R. v. Valleley, 32 Ohio St. 345 (1877),
and Haley v. Chicago & N. W. R., 21 Iowa, I5 (1866),
[drunken passenger run over by later train], the expulsion
itself being considered not the proximate cause. See, also,
Roseman v. Carolina C, R., I12 N. C. 709 (1893); LouisRville,
Etc., R. v.Johnson, 92 Ala. 204 (189o); 2 Shear. & R., Neg.,
(5th Ed.), § 493; 3 Wood, Railrbads, (2d Ed.), § 362.
Wilson, J., in Giles v. Great W. R., 36 Upper Canada, 369,
declared that a conductor, who knew the intoxicated and
helpless state of the passenger, was bound to give him that
degree of attention . . . which a man in the state of the
deceased is fairly entitled to beyond that of the ordinary

passenger.
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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.

In Austin v. State, 48 S. W. 305 (Supreme Court of
Tennessee), the Tennessee Act, prohibiting the manufacture
interstate and sale of cigarettes, was held to apply constituCommerce, tionally to those brought in from other states.
Cigarette
wi
Origina
Two
remarkable resolutions were made by the
Packages
court: (I) Cigarettes are so well-known to be
deleterious, morally and 'physically, that courts will take
judicial .notice of that fact and of the resultant fact that they.
are not proper subjects of interstate commerce; (2) A covered
basket, owned by the carrier and used for convenient transportation of packages of cigarettes, is, itself, an "original
package," broken as soon as the lid is raised.
The Supreme Court of Georgia has decided that a salesman
taking orders by sample for goods manufactured in another
Interstate state, is not engaged in interstate commerce, if the
Commerce, orders are filled, not from the point of manufacture,
Sales by
but from a distributing warehouse located in the
Samples,
state in which the salesman operates. Such a
Intrastate
Distributing salesman is, accordingly, subject to a local license
Point
law : L. B. Price Co. v. City of Atlanta, 31 S.E.
619. It seems clear that the court is right. Products shipped
in advance of sale to a distributing depot in the state of sale,
certainly become intermingled with the general mass of
property there, and both the goods and the selling of them
should be taxable: Brown v. Houston, 114 U. S.622.
One who, of his own accord, invokes the aid of a court
cannot afterwards complain of its decision. The case of Grant
v. Buckner, 19 Sup. Ct. 17 1, decides that a receiver
Federal
Court,
in a Federal court who voluntarily goes into a
Right of
state court cannot question the right of that court
Withdrawal to determine the controversy
between himself and
the other party in the suit.
The South Carolina Revenue Bond Scrip, issued under the
Act of March 2, 1872, being made receivable for taxes and for
payment of obligations owing by the state, was
" Bills of
Credit"
intended to pass as money, and under the United
States Constitution, is void: Wesley v. Eells (Circuit Ct., N. D.
Ohio), co Fed. 15 1.
CONTRACTS.

In Atcheson, T. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Cunningham (Supreme
Court of Kansas), 54 Pac. 1055, it was held that a release
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CONTRACTS (Continued).

Influence,
Release
to

Rlway

obtained from an injured passenger by a railroad
agent, shortly after the accident, was invalid,
since it appeared that. the wounds operated to

Company

make the passenger weak both physically and

Undue

mentally.

In De Baun v. Brand, 41 AtI. 958, -the Court of Errors
and Appeals of New Jersey decides that the rule that it is
contrary to public policy for persons to enter into
Auction,
Agreement an agreement having for its object the suppresNotto Bid sion of competition in bidding at a public sale, is
not applicable to the case of a person who, having an interest
in the property to be sold, for the protection of such interest,
agrees not to bid at the sale.
The Court of Errors and Appeals of New Jersey, in Hensler v. Jennings, 41 At. gig, holds that under a statute providing that any person who deposits money with
Wager,
Liability of a stakeholder upon the event of a wager prohibStakeholder ited by any law of the state, may sue for and
recover the same, a person making such deposit may recover,
though the event on which the wager is laid takes place out
of the state.
The Supreme Court of Iowa has decided that the use of
profane and insulting language is no excuse for a refusal to
Refusal to permit one to carry out a contract, when the conAllow
duct of the other party tended strongly to proCompletion voke such outburst: Thwmpson et al. v. Brown et
ux., 76 N. W. 819.
CORPORATIONS.

Can a principal, who was not in existence at the time a
contract was made, be held liable upon it by an application of
Contracts of the doctrine of "ratification ?" If it be asked
Promoters, whether a contract made on behalf of an unborn
Ratification
child can afterwards be enforced against him upon
his birth and coming of age, the answer will doubtless be in
the negative, even if he has, in expressed words, signified his
willingness to be bound. So, also, if it be asked whether (for
example) an undertaker, who has buried a testator at the request of a relative, can recover in contract against an executor
subsequently appointed, it will probably be concluded that,
whatever his rights may be, they are not contract rights-even
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CORPORATIONS (Continued).

if the executor expressly promises to pay. The doctrine of
ratification has no application where the principal is not in
existence at the date of the act in question. See Melhzado v.
Porto Allegre Ry. Co., L. R. 9 C. P. 503 (1874). Where A
sells goods at B's request, on the credit of a corporation
thereafter to be organized, and the corporation receives the
goods and uses them, how can A have a contract right against
the corporation? It is submitted that he can have no such.
right, although the courts persistently refuse to analyze such
a case and profess to explain it upon a doctrine of " ratification," as was done by the Court of Civil Appeals of Texas,
in Lancastr Gin & Compress Co. v. Murray Ginning System
CO., 47 S. W. 387. Of course, A, in such a case, is entitled
to recover-just as the undertaker is entitled to recover in
the illustration given. The recovery, however, is in quasicontract, for the benefit conferred. The distinction is not only
of theoretical importance, but may be of great practical importance, as appears from such an unjust decision as Tft v.
Quaker City Bank, 141 Pa. 550 (1891).

In Kansas (Gen. St. 1889, c. 23, §§ 32, 46), there is a
statutory provision to regulate the right of a judgment credStattory - itor of a corporation to enforce against a stockuiabityof holder his liability for unpaid balances, and an
Stockholder, additional statutory liability equal to the amount
Set-off
of the defendant's stock. In 1Musgrau v. Associa-

ton, 49 Pac. 338, it was decided that against this additional
statutory liability the stockholder may set-off sums paid by
him in discharge of corporate debts and claims held by him
against the corporation. The Circuit Court for the District
of Maryland, in a case involving the Kansas statute, has now
properly held a plea of set-off bad which fails to show
whether the counterclaim was acquired before or after the
corporate insolvency; and if after, what percentage of its face
value the defendant paid for it: Brown v. Trail, 89 Fed. 641.
The courts of New Jersey display a commendable willingness to break away from the artificial rules which this century
Power of a has produced on the subject of corporate power.
Corporation In Chapman v. Iron Clad Rheostat Co., 41 Aft.
to Buy its 690, the Supreme Court has incidentally exOwn Stock, pressed approval of the earlier decision in Cam"Ultra Vires"
den & A. R. Co. v. May's Landing, Etc., Co., 48
N. J. L. 530, which goes a long way towards permitting
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recovery of damages for the breach of a so-called " ul tra vires
-contract." The point actually decided in the Chapman case,
however, is that, -under the New Jersey corporation act, a corporation may buy its own stock for legitimate corporate purposes. An employe declined, on a contract, to repurchase
his holding of stock upon the cessation of his employment.
'The corporation's demurrer was overruled. This satisfactory
result is diametrically opposed to what was declared to be the
-common law rule in Coppin v. Greenlese Co., 38 Ohio St. 275.
Judge Simonton, in Tompkins Co. v. Chester Mi1s, 90 Fed.
37,has made an allowance for expenses, out of the estate of an
Insolvency, insolvent corporation, to the unsecured creditor
Creditor's who first began the proceedings for distribution,
Suit,
although, as it turned out, intervening lien credAllowances
itors and bondholders exhausted the fund and
left nothing but the judge's allowance for the unfortunate
-complainant.
The Supreme Court of Missouri, in Exter v. Sawyer, 47 S.
W. 951, has added another decision to the group of those
Promoter, which recognize the salutary principle that a proFiduiary moter must account for a secret profit made
Character at the expense of stockholders, who had reposed confidence in him. The court reviews Densmore Oii
Co. v. Densmore, 64 Pa. 43 ; Sombrero Phosphate Co. v. Erlanger, 5 Ch. Div. 73, and other cases. Readers who are interrsted in this subject will do well to read Adelbert Hamilton's article in 16 American Law Rev. 671.
-CRIMINAL LAW.

In Bergman v. People, 52 N. E. 363, the defendant went to
a jeweler and stated that certain people, including himself,
wished to make a wedding present, and that he
Larceny
by Ballee
wanted to take some jewelry to show such persons.
'he jeweler declined to deliver it into his possession unless he
had security, whereupon the defendant gave an instrument
purporting to guarantee the payment of whatever jewelry the
defendant should buy of prosecutor for not over $2oo. The
-defendant then got the jewelry, and promised to return it, or
the money for it, within three days. The jewelry was not
returned nor paid for. The representations as to the wedding
present were false and made to obtain the jewelry. Held,
guilty of larceny as a bailee. The court said that the guar-
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CRIMINAL LAW (Continued).

anty was available only in case a sale was consummated, but
the jewelry was never sold, and the title never passed out of
the jeweler. The defendant simply had it to exhibit to others,
who, like himself, contemplated buying, and converted it to
his own use while such relation existed.
The propriety of allowing a jury to determine the punishment to be meted out to criminals convicted of murder has
always been questioned. Yet the Supreme Court'
Determination of Pun. of the United States, in the case of Winston v.
ishment by
United States, I9 Sup. Ct. 245, held that a verdict
Jury.
of guilty "without capital punishment" may be
rendered in a murder case under the Act of Congress of
January 15, x897, chap. 29, even if there are no mitigating
or palliating circumstances.
DAMAGES.

The Supreme Court of Vermont has again announced its
adherence to the rule that no recovery can be had by a father
for the burial expenses of his child, killed by the
Death by
WrongfulAct, negligence of the defendant: Trow v. Thomas,
Burias
41 At. 652. The decision is in accord with the
Expenses

right of authority, but seems an inequitable and

illogical one. If, as is conceded, the father may recover for
medical expenses incurred prior to the child's death, he ought,
also, to recover what is just as proximate a consequence of
the wrongful act, namely, the burial expenses: See, Cross v.
Guthrie, 2 Root, 9 o . The rule is a survival of the doctrine,
actio persona/is moitur cer persona. The same ruling has
been extended even to the case of death by the felonious act
of another: Insurance Co. v. Brame, 95 U. S. 754. (See
note in this issue.)
GUARANTY.

A written agreement of guaranty, like any other such agreement, may be reformed upon clear proof that it
does not express the actual intentions of both parties; the
rule that mistakes of law cannot be corrected have no application to such a case: Bank v. Mann, 76 N. W. (Wis.) 777.
Reformation

The courts have always been astute to exonerate from
liability on a guaranty one who has merely proposed to guarantee without the completed contract
being made. Lamb v. Carley, 54 N. Y. Suppl. 8o4, is such a
Incomplete
Contract
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GUARANTY (Continued).

case, where the incompleteness was shown by the statement
"that the details would be stated more definitely when the
money was sent."
HUSBAND AND WIE.

Two cases arising under the Nebraska statute, authorizing
divorce for extreme cruelty, whether practiced by using
personal violence or by any other means, are
Divorce,
Walton v. Walton, 77 N. W. (Neb.) 392, and
Extreme
Berdolt v. Berdolt, 77 N. W. (Neb.) 399. The
Cruelty
former was a libel by the wife, charging cruelty by, among
other things, calling her obscene and vile names : disregarding
the unproved charge of infidelity on her part, the court held
(i) that disobedience of his orders in such matters as visiting
her family, whether improper or not, was not such conduct as
justified him in this treatment of her-it being in no sense the
natural and probable consequence of her misconduct; and
(2), after criticising Shaw v. Skaw, 17 Conn. 189 "which
follows the common law rule,--see Russell v. Russell, 6 897]
A. C. 395), that false charges of infidelity and calling of vile
names in itself constitutes extreme cruelty.
In the second case, false charges of physical incompetency
to perform her marital duties were held such extreme cruelty
as to entitle her to a divorce upon her cross bill in a suit
instituted by him upon the faith of these charges. (See note
in this issue.)
The Dakota Divorce Laws which have been the cause of so
much litigation in the East, were the subject of discussion in
Divorce in Streitwolfv. Streitwo/f, 41 Atl. (N. J.) 876, Pitney,
Another State V. C., holding, in an oral opinion, that a divorce
obtained in Dakota, by virtue of a mala fide three months'
residence, was not recognized in New Jersey, and could not be
a defence to a divorce proceeding instituted by the deserted
wife in that state.
Canale v. People, 52 N. E. (Ill.) 310, gives a correct exposition of the proof required of foreign marriages. Canale was
indicted for bigamy, and the prosecution proved
Proof o
that he had gone through a marriage ceremony
Foreign
Marriage in Italy; while admitting that this would be presumed to have been done according to Italian law, the court,
nevertheless, held that, a competent witness having testified
that the marriage was absolutely void in Italy because of noncompliance with statutory requirements, the defendant should
have received binding instructions.
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INSURANCE.

A curiously precise construction of the word "in " may be
found in Van Bokkelen v. Traveler's Ins. Co. of Hartford, 54
N. Y. Suppl. 307. The defendant insured, interAccident
Insurance,
alia, against accidental death with a further proConstruction vision for double indemnity should the injuries be
of Policy,
",ina Con-

sustained while the insured was "riding as a
passenger in any passenger conveyance." The
insured went upon the platform of a passenger car \vhile the
train was running slowly; he was thrown to the ground,
dragged for some distance, holding to the hand-rail or step of
the platform, and then killed by falling to the road below a
bridge which the train was then crossing. The court holds
that the double indemnity would not be payable were the
insured injured while riding outside of or upon a passenger
conveyance. The platform was without the body of the car
in which the passengers were usually carried; there was,
therefore, in this case no double liability under the policy.
The court, moreover, intimates that the death was not due to
injuries sustained while the insured was even upon the train.
What would be the ruling in the case of a passenger conveyance carrying all the passengers outside? In other words,
is the decision to be limited to conveyances having an interior
and presumably safer place for carrying passengers ? The
court quotes with approval the following passage from the
opinion in Scioonmaker v. Hoyt, 148 N. Y. 43 1.
" In the construction of contracts . . .the intention of the
parties . . . is to be sought in the words and language
employed, and if the words are free from ambiguity, and
express plainly the purpose of the instrument, there is no
occasion for interpretation. Contracts or statutes are to be
read and understood according to the natural and obvious
import of the language, without resorting to subtle and forced
construction for the purpose of either limiting or extending
their operation . . . If the words employed convey a definite
meaning, and there is no contradiction or ambiguity in the
different parts of the same instrument, then the apparent
meaning of the instrument must be regarded as the one
intended."
This may well be compared with the decision in Menniley
v. Insurance Corporation, reported in the same volume (148
N. Y. 6oo) and referred to in our note in this number upon
MI'Glotter v. Provident Mutual Accident Co., 89 Fed. 685.
veyance"

M'Afaster v. Ncw York Life Ins. Co., 90 Fed. 40, contains
a most elaborate argument of some propositions that are made
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INSURANCE (Continued).
Life

Insurance,
Annual
Premiums,
Forfeiture

to appear almost self evident. The Appellate
Court, however, had ruled the question otherwise
in an equity proceeding involving the same policy
(87 Fed. 63), which constrained the court in this
proceeding to enter a judgment adverse to the

opinion delivered. A policy provided that it should not be in
force until the first premium was paid; it was dated December
i8th, but the first premium was not paid until December 26th;
the policy contained a provision that thereafter the annual
premium should be paid on December 12th; the insured died
January x8th, thirteen months later, and the question was
whether this was within the month's grace allowed him by the
terms of the policy for the payment of the second premium.
Judge Shiras considered the policy a contract for the life of
the assured, subject to forfeiture for non-payment of premiums,
rather than a renewable yearly contract; the burden, therefore,
was on the insurer to establish the forfeiture. The terms of
the policy being inconsistent, the construction most favorable
to the insured was adopted, for "the construction must be
against the party who prepared the contract," and "if possible,
the contract must be so construed as to sustain it, and not to
defeat it." The insurer had no right, consequently, to forfeit
the policy for the non-payment of the second premium, and
the court held that a policy once in force is not terminated by
the failure to pay premiums unless the right to forfeit it is
reserved.
It will be found interesting to compare this very thorough
opinion with that of the Circuit Court of Appeals in 87 Fed. 63.
MASTER AND SERVANT.

In Di Vito v. Crage, 55 N. Y. Suppl. 64, the servant's
assumption of the risks of his employment is said to be based
Assumption
of Risk

upon the performance by the master of the duties

imposed upon him; the rule excuses the master
only when the injury results from a cause which could not
have reasonably been foreseen and guarded against by him.
The somewhat delicate duties of a master, with respect to a
discharged servant, are set forth in Hundley v. Louisville & N.
Discharge, R. Co., 48 S. W. (Ky.) 429. The plaintiff comConduct of

plained that he had been discharged from the

employ of the defendant company, and that a false
entry of the cause of his discharge upon the records of the
company rendered it impossible for him to obtain similar
Master
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employment with other companies. The court admitted his
right to pursue any lawful occupation, and that it'would be a
legal injury to prevent him from so doing; but a demurrer -to
his petition was sustained on the ground that he had set forth
only legal conclusions as to his damage and not the actual
consequences of defendant's wrongful acts.
The Supreme Court of Indiana, in MFarlan Carriage Co.
v. Potter, 52 N. E. 209, passed on the question of the duty of
Assumption a master when a servant notifies him of a defect
of Risk,
in machinery and the master promises to repair it.
Promise to
They held where the master promises to repair it,
Repair
either specifically or generally, the servant does
not assume the risk of injury from such defect by remaining
at work, with knowledge thereof, for a reasonable time to
allow such repairs to be made. Where, however, the promise
is to repair after the completion of the work on hand, the
servant assumes the risk of injury until such time by continuing at work. In this case the servant complained of a defect
in a saw. The master promised to repair as soon as the
present order was run out. The servant was injured in the
meantime and, of course, under the above rules, could not
recover.
The Supreme Court of Michigan, in Wacksmaz v. Shaw
Electric Crane Co., 76 N. W. 497, decided that the master is
not bound to periodically inspect small tools in
Defective
Appliances, everyday use, in which defects may be ascertained
Inspection by the servants themselves. The man who uses
it must judge of its fitness. The tool in question was a hammer, but the same rule would apply to crowbars, picks,
shovels, chisels, files, etc.

MORTGAGES.

The usual litigation arising out of the execution of a deed
as security for a loan is a bill by the grantor to redeem. In
Absolute Deed C/tinev. Robbins. 55 Pac. (Cal.) 150, we lkve such
as Mortgage a suit by a grantee to have the deed, absolute on
its face, declared a mortgage, which was done, after some
doubt in the lower court as to whether in such a case, after
holding the transaction to be a mortgage, a foreclosure of the
mortgage could be ordered.
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Hossack v. Graham, 55 Pac. (Wash.) 36, is a decision with
which no.lawyer is likely to find fault, in view of the difficulA company,
Equitable ties surrounding equitable liens.
Mortgage,

What

Constitutes

having executed a mortgage in the usual form,

added thereto a covenant that 25 per cent. of the
proceeds of the sale of all other lands of the mort-

gagor company (describing them) should be paid by a bank
and from a sinking fund for the further securing of the mortgage debt. It was held that this was a mere personal agreement and did not constitute an equitable lien on the other
lands, even as against the subsequent mortgagees, with actual
notice.
Huzza v. Sikorski, 76 N.W. (Wis.) i 117, decides that, where
an agent of a mortgagor has been given money to
Agent of
Mortgagee, pay off the mortgage, he does not thereby become
Garnishment the debtor of the mortgagee, so as to subject him
to garnishment by the mortgagee's creditor.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.

The Supreme Court of Louisiana, in City of New Orleans
v. Werlein, 24 So. 232, following the well-established rule that
property, property of a municipality, once dedicated to
Non-Allen-. public use, is extra commercia, allowed a recovery
of such property by the city, twenty years after a
ability
sale of same under an execution against the municipality, it
not clearly appearing that previous to the same the public use
had been abandoned or lost by non-user.
NBGLIGBNCE.

An interesting question arose in Isaackson v. Duluth St. Ry.
Co., 77 N. W. 433, where the rules of a street railway comStreet Rail. pany imposed a greater degree of care on the
ways, Rules
of Company
Requiring

Greater
Degree of
Care than
the Law

motorman than the law did, and the question was

whether the plaintiff could take advantage of it
and treat it as the criterion of due care.

he could not.

Held,

Special rules made for the guid-

ance of the company's employes were not to
govern, but he must rely on the general rule
of

law that everybody must use a reasonable degree of care to
avoid causing injury to another. This is especially true where
the plaintiff did not know of the rule and his conduct was not
influenced by it.
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Chesapeake and Ohio Ry. Co. v. Perkins, 47 S. W. 259,
was an action for damages resu.lting from an' injury reTrespasser on ceived by being struck by a train while trespassing (walking) upon the railroad tracks. On the
Railroad
Tracks, Duty question as to what duty a railroad company
of Company owed a person who was walking along its tracks
the Kentucky Court of Appeals held that the company must
use reasonable care to avoid injuring him, after discovering
his danger; that in cities where persons are likely to be found
trespassing it must keep a lookout along its tracks, and, when
discovered, must avoid hitting him even to the extent of stopping the train.

PARENT AND CHILD.

The familiar rule that a child must prove an express contract to recover wages from its parent is applied to the claim
of a grandchild against its grandfather's estate in
Wages
Jackson's Adn'r v.Jackson, 31 S. E. (Va.) 78.

PARTNERSHIP.

X and Y were partners. X sold out to Y, Y covenanting
to pay firm debts. The firm being solvent, this transfer conRule in Ex verted the firm property into the separate propparte Ruffin, erty of Y: Exparte Ru;fin, 6 Ves. 127.
Y then
Partner's formed a partnership with B into which he put the
Equity
property late of the old firm. On dissolution of
Y and B, Y conveys his interest in the property to B in trust
for payment of debts of Y and B and debts of Y for which
B was liable. A, a creditor of the old firm of X and Y, filed
a bill to subject the property in the hands of B to a payment
of his claim. Obviously, under Er parte Ruflin (supra), A
had no right against the property merely ih virtue of the
former ownership of X and Y. Nor had he rights in virtue
of the terms of the conveyance from Y to B, because A's
debt was not one for which B was liable. The court properly
dismissed A's bill, but the reasons given are not very clear or
satisfactory, the rule in Er parteRuffin not being even referred
to. To the extent that there is in the opinion an intimation
that a transfer of a partner's interest extinguishes the partner's
equity the opinion is certainly unsound: Wolfe v. Ptingle, 3 I
S. E. 605 (Supr. Ct. of App. of Virginia).
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In Win v. Devine (Court of Errors and Appeals of New
Jersey), 41 Atl. 213, three co-owners of property brought reco-Owners plevin for it. As the three had once been memurroneoasiy bers of a firm since dissolved they were led into
Suing a
the error of suing as Jacob Win and others,
Partners
"trading under the firm name and style of Win
& Sons." It is clear that if the defendant had filed a plea
denying the existence of a partnership and the plaintiffs had
accepted the issue thus tendered, the parties would have gone
to trial on an immaterial point. The plaintiffs would have
been in law entitled to recover because they were co-owners,
but they would, nevertheless, have lost their case, because the jury could not have avoided finding a verdict for
the defendant on the issue as joined. Failing to grasp this
situation, the trial judge non-suited the plaintiffs on the theory
that the failure to prove the partnership as alleged was a fatal
variance. On appeal decision was promptly reversed, the
court remarking "the impropriety of this ruling is manifest."
George v. Benjamin, 76 N. W. 619, recently decided by the
Supreme Court of Wisconsin, represents an interesting application of the rule that a partner may sue his coRight of
partner at law on a promise to contribute capital.
Action an
Promlset, The expressions cited by the court from the
Cntriue opinion in Glover v. Tuck, 24 Wend. 153, and
Capital
from Collier, Part. 132, really originated
with
Lord Ellenborough in Venning v. Leckie, 13 East, 7. This is
perhaps the leading case on the subject. See other authorities collected in note on p. 462, Ames's Cases on Partnership.

PLEADING AND PRACTICE.

Cases under the "War Revenue" Act may be expected to
pop up from time to time as the requirements of the new law
Revenue Act
Recording

shall be tested and determined in the courts. The

First Department (Appellate Division) of the
Non-Sta"-Ped Supreme Court of New York has recently ruled a
instrument a practical point of everyday importance.
The
decision was that the provisions of sections 14 and 15 of the
Revenue Act of I868, that no unstamped instruments required
to be stamped shall be recorded, applies only to records pursuant to United States Statutes. Therefore a Register of
Deeds must file an instrument for record under the Laws of
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PLEADING AND PRACTICE (Continued).

New York though it is not stamped. The opinion of O'Brien,
J.: is, that "the responsibility of seeing the proper stamp
affixed rests upon the parties to the instrument . . . To hold•

that such a duty rested upon the register would be to constitute him a judicial instead of a ministerial officer:" People v.
Fromme, 54 N. Y. Suppl. 833.
The Supreme Court of Missouri has decided that there is no
distinction between cases to be tried by the court and those to be
Change of
Venue
under
Statute of

tried by a jury, that the right to a change of venue

applies to a suit in equity in that state, under the

Missouri not statutes, which is as follows: "A change of venue

may be awarded in any civil suit to any court of
record, for any of the follow causes. First, that
the judge is interested or prejudiced, or is related to either
party, or has been of counsel in the cause ; second, that the
opposite party has an undue influence over the mind of the
judge; third, that the inhabitants of the county are prejudiced
against the applicant; fourth, that the opposite party has an
undue influence over the inhabitants of the county: " Walker
v. Ellis, 48 S. W. 457.
Limited to
Jury Trial

PRINCIPAL AND AGENT.

The liquor laws have been the occasion of many applications of the law of agency, one frequent point of which is
Evasion of

illustrated in Cunningham v. State, 31 S. E. (Ga.)

585. C, at N's request, undertook to buy for
him some liquor in a county where its sale was forbidden.
M, the owner, upon the facts being explained to him, refused
to sell on credit, as was doubtless C's hope, but delivered it to
C, with instructions to bring back either the liquor or its price.
He returned the price, but the court held that, although a
person may be agent for both parties to a contract, yet C was
not, under the circumstances, M's agent, and his conviction
was set aside.
Liquor Laws

The Supreme Court of Michigan very properly decides in
Carlandv. Western Union Telegraph Co., 76 N. V. 762, that
a telegraph operator is the agent of the company
Telegraph
Company,
in receiving over a telephone and writing a mesOperator
sage to be transmitted by the company, in the
absence of proof that the regulations of the company forbade
it, and that the sender had notice of such regulations.
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PROPERTY.

A report was read before an incorporated so iety, and was
accepted by the society. Subsequently a person not a member of the society, but who was present at the
Rights In
time of the report by reason of an invitation of the
Literary
Productions general public to the meeting, procured a copy
of the report and used certain extracts therefrom for advertising purposes. The society filed a bill to restrain such use
of the report. The answer was a dedication of it to the
public, by reason of its being read in a meeting to which the
public was invited. An injunction was granted: DentalSociety v. Denticura Co., 4 Atl. (N. J.) 672. In support of the
opinion of the court, that the facts in the case did not constitute a dedication to the public, see Tompkins v. Halleck, 133
Mass. 32 ; Palmerv. DeWitt, 47 N.Y. 532 ; Abernetly v. Hutchinson, 3 L. J. Ch. 20 9 ; Cairdv. Sine, 12 App. Cas. 326.
RECEIVERS.

In different jurisdictions different rules exist as to the requirements of a bill praying for the appointment of a receiver.
Appointment, In Alabama a simple contract creditor of a corporation may not obtain a receiver, though the
Who May
corporation has ceased to be a going concern;
Obtain
there must exist some recognized principle of equity jurisdiction, such as fraud: Smith-Dimmick Lumber Co. v. Teague,
24 So. (Ala.) 4.
SURETYSHIP.

Utah Bank v. Forbes, 55 Pac. (Utah) 61, is an authority for
the elementary princip!e that, upon payment by a surety, he is
entitled to be subrogated to all rights of the
Surety,
Subrogation creditor against the principal-as for example, in
the case cited-to maintain the suit begun by the creditor
against the principal on the original obligation.
TRIAL.

The Supreme Court of Washington takes no chances when
the possibility of a juror being influenced is in question. In
State v. McCormick, 54 Pac. 764, a new trial was
Jury.
granted the defendant, who had been convicted of
Delivering
Letters after assault with intent to commit murder, on the
ground that the court authorized two letters and
Retiring
a paper to be delivered to two jurors without the defendant's
consent, notwithstanding the statement of the trial judge that
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he had examined the letters before allowing them to be delivered, and had ascertained that they were from a considerable distance and had been in transit for several days, and"
that he had also examined the paper, and found that it contained nothing relative to the case at issue. (See note in this
issue.)
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS.

In Kuli v. Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co., 77 N. W. 15 5, it was
held that the statute of limitations applies to suits to recover
Damages for damages for the taking of and by a railroad cornProperty
pany under the right of eminent domain, whether
Taken by
the action in which such recovery is to be had
Right of mi-n is prescribed by statute or not. A contraryrule
is followed in Pennsylvania: Keller v. Ry. Co., 15I
Pa. 67; Ry. Co. v. Burston, 61 Pa. 369. The principal case
overrules Tucker v. Ry. Co., 91 Wis. 576. It is in accord with
the weight of authority: Ry. Co. v. McCauley, 121 Ill. 16o;
Prattv. Ry. Co., 72 Iowa, 249; Lyles v. Ry. Co., 73 Tex. 95;
Frankelv.Jackson, 30 Fed. 398.
TRUSTS.

A deposited in a bank a check with unrestricted indorsement. The payor was in a distant city. The bank of deWhen a Debt, posit credited the depositor with the face value of
Not a Trust, is the check. The check was lost in transmission
Created
to the payor. There was no evidence that the
bank of deposit had stated to the depositor that they considered themselves merely agents for collection. The court held
that the transaction amounted to a sale to the bank by the
depositor, and, therefore, that questions in regard to the negligence of the bank of deposit were immaterial: Taft v. Bank,
52 N. E. (Mass.) 387.
A testator left property to his wife in these words: "I give
all my estate to my said wife, to the end that she may be able
to maintain a home for herself, and one where
Creation,
Precatory she can receive all our dear Ichildren, as we have
Words
been accustomed to during our joint lives . . .
and that when she shall no longer need the property it will
be equally divided among our dear children, or their representatives." The court held that these words did not create
a trust: Aldrich v. Aldrich, 51 N. E. (Mass.) 449.

